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ABSTRACT 
 If personae are masks used to communicate a certain character in 
performance, what happens in rapid unmaskings, especially as they occur in 
digital space? That question is central to the phenomenon of “troll-hunting”. 
Employing both journalistic and algorithmic tools, troll hunters unmask the 
offline identity of purveyors of digital hate speech, child pornography, illegal 
commerce and sometimes just puckish behaviour. Digital citizens have 
concerned themselves with the efficacy, privacy and ethics of such hunting, but 
have not as frequently explored another area: the narrative distance between a 
digital persona and a perceived “real” person behind that persona. Such 
distances can range from some version of the sentiment, "I am in no way this 
kind of person" to a comfortable coupling between online-offline selves, even 
during public shaming. Using textual analysis, I critically examine statements 
made by those whose digital troll persona were unmasked. I pay special 
attention to the word ‘I’ and the dissonance in offline-online personae, long 
discussed by academics, but also becoming an increasingly practical concern. 
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INTRODUCTION  
It appeared, at first, to be cause for celebration, and HanAssholeSolo, a reddit user, basked in it. 
In early June of 2017, President Donald Trump had posted a video version of an animated GIF 
on Twitter. Plucking images from a televised event in which pre-president Trump pretended to 
clothesline a central figure of the World Wrestling Entertainment, the redditor had replaced the 
face of Trump’s original foe with a CNN logo. In a subreddit dedicated to all things Trump, the 
anonymous member exclaimed, “Wow!! I never expected my meme to be retweeted by the God 
Emporer [sic] himself!!!” (Romano 2017). But just days later, all of the commentary from 
HanAssholeSolo, and the GIF itself, were gone. Still anonymous to most of the world, but now 
known to CNN investigative reporter Andrew Kaczynski, the future of the person behind the GIF 
rested in the hands of the news organisation he had mocked. In between those events were 
revelations that HanAssholeSolo was behind many putrid comments about people of colour, 
women and Jewish people. On the verge of being outed, HanSoloAsshole posted on that same 
subreddit page: 
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First of all, I would like to apologize to the members of the reddit community 
for getting this site and this sub embroiled in a controversy that should never 
have happened. I would also like to apologize for the posts made that were 
racist, bigoted, and anti-semitic. I am in no way this kind of person, I love and 
accept people of all walks of life and have done so for my entire life. (Kaczynski 
2017) 
With a single email from a journalist, which made clear that HanAssholeSolo had become the 
successful target of troll-hunting, the narrative of a digital persona flipped at breakneck speed. 
While this incident could be studied in many disciplines, troll-hunting’s effect on the private-
public negotiation of identity in digital space is particularly rich and a useful lens on persona 
creation for all digital purposes. 
Two practical definitions guide this research. Troll-hunting, first, is the quintessential 
Internet vigilante instinct. From journalists to hackers to social media platforms, the goal is 
simple: find Internet trolls and stop them by blocking access to a platform or exposing (or 
threatening to expose) the offline person or people responsible. Secondly, what defines trolls is 
negotiated both within online ecosystems (Twitter denizens perceive it differently than 
redditors) and across social discourse in offline cultures. For a deeper look into the term, 
Morrissey & Yell’s (2016) article presents a useful etymology and history of the term “trolls” as 
it has emerged in digital space. Edstrom (2016, p. 98) also offers a valuable definition when she 
writes that “trolls are a metaphor in the Nordic countries that signify beings that fear the light; 
Internet trolls are people who write offensive things in order to provoke reaction”. Phillips and 
Milner (2017, p. 17) also offer a helpful warning against defining trolling too broadly, using it as 
a “catch-all” for any mischief or antagonism, which “tends to minimize the negative effects of the 
worst kinds of online behaviors”. So what HanAssholeSolo created that inspired President 
Trump’s tweet might not meet the most rigorous criteria, but many of the statements he made 
on reddit in other threads did. Yet it was the image that Trump used that made his unmasking 
big news. 
For this paper, I do not aim to plumb the depths of the trolls’ gratifications or the effect 
on digital life. That’s not to dismiss the complexities of assuming a separate identity for the 
purpose of trolling, a field of research that is rich in its own right (Phillips 2011; Milner 2013; 
Bishop 2013 and 2014; Dynel 2016) or the effects of online discourse, which can be severe 
(Butler 1997) to the point of life-threatening (Morrissey & Yell 2016).  I am interested, however, 
in the internal relationship between digital troll persona and what is still all too often 
considered the “real” person behind the digital name and what that tells us about the division 
between the online and offline self, regularly self-referenced in both spaces as I. The recent 
work of Phillips and Milner (2017), especially their description of “identity play”, can speed us 
forward quickly on this point. Identity play is a fast-moving negotiation between our concept of 
self and the present or perceived audience, both sides playing critical roles in forming that 
present-moment identity. Rooted heavily in Goffman’s (1959) impression management, the 
authors argue that these negotiations mean “we all make conscious, unconscious, and 
sometimes semi-conscious behavioral and linguistic choices to highlight certain masks” (Phillips 
& Milner 2017, p. 76). We adjust the mask not only to conform to a certain audience, but also 
sometimes “toward a particular audience, against a particular object” (p. 79). This is where 
trolling finds its traction, such as when men target women for the delight of the like-minded and 
the horror or fury of others, and, “These behaviors, in turn, help create and sustain the I; they 
reveal what a person values, and the groups with which they identify” (p. 78). But this notion of 
play takes on another set of values, that of the game itself. In the instances I examine below, the 
light has been shone on the offline people who have stirred the emotions of online communities. 
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But troll-hunting also snatches away a “win” in the gameplay of identity. If anyone has ever 
watched professional wrestling in which a masked grappler is involved, you know being 
unmasked is a greater defeat than being pinned. Though the consequences can be more severe 
in troll-hunting, the unmasking itself entails a similar sort of victory. This is partially true 
because creating and sustaining I in such a moment is fraught with challenges. 
What happens in rapid unmaskings, especially as they occur in digital space? For 
HanAssholeSolo, a massive rift opens between the pre- and post-hunting I, but this is not always 
the case. In performing textual analysis of digital persona of trolls and their creators, the 
distance between the pre- and post-hunted troll persona varies widely. Behind that variation is 
a collection of narratives, which also vary, but illuminate assumptions most users of the Internet 
appear to hold. In discussing troll-hunting, digital citizens have concerned themselves with the 
efficacy, privacy and ethics of such searches, but have not as frequently explored another area: 
the digital dualism (Jurgenson 2011) of considering a digital persona to be constructed by a 
“real” I, which remains prominent among digital citizens.  
To resist this common notion, many scholars convincingly address the realness of the 
online life. I hope to reframe the question by looking in the other direction: be questioning the 
realness of our offline self, or at least the way we reference that self, via an essay by philosopher 
G.E.M. Anscombe involving the metaphysics of self-reference. Coupled with the concept of the 
“dialogical self” by Herbert J.M. Hermans, a unifying theme is described of the offline self as a 
negotiation of many personae, which I will apply to the responses of trolls when they have been 
hunted down. I will then conclude this paper by exploring the underlying narratives that allow 
not only trolls, but most digital citizens, to overemphasise a divide between digital and physical 
selves.  
PERSONA, I AND DIALOGICAL SELF 
The questions of persona, seen as one side of a delineation of private/public selves, quickly 
became fodder for early digital theorists. Turkle (1984) famously spoke of a “second self” as an 
affordance of computing before the World Wide Web existed and Clark (1994, para 5) perceived 
the persona to be “supplemented, and to some extent even replaced” by the summation of the 
data available about an individual. He conceives of three types of digital personae—passive 
(data-creation), active (agentive-presence) and autonomous (digitally self-activating)—which 
can further be categorised as projected or imposed as well as formal and informal. But his most 
relevant contribution for this paper is an index of motivations to develop multiple personae in 
digital space (Clark 1994, para 18): 
● the maintenance of a distinction between multiple roles (e.g. psychiatrist or 
social worker and spouse/parent; employed professional and spokesperson for 
a professional body; and scout-master and spy); 
● the exercise of artistic freedom; 
● the experimental stimulation of responses (e.g. the intentional provocation of 
criminal acts, but also the recent instance of a male impersonating a physically 
impaired female); 
● willing fantasy (as in role-playing in multi-user dungeons and dragons or 
MUDDs); 
● paranoia (i.e. to protect against unidentified and unlikely risks); and 
● fraud and other types of criminal behaviour.  
Each mask created for digital consumption holds with the core concept of a creator’s internal 
expression negotiating with a public, the “identity play” of Phillips and Milner (2017). So, trolls 
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might perceive themselves creating a digital persona for “artistic (expressive) freedom” and 
very likely “stimulation of responses”. The data created in that digital performance does not 
supplement the persona, or replace it, but rather complexifies it. Or, as Nolan (2015) argues, it 
fragments the self. Using catfishers (pretending to be someone you’re not) as a focus, Nolan 
offers insights into its cousin, the troll, who, “lacks influence and legitimacy because through his 
similar, but calculatedly covert, interpretation of the fragmented self, he blatantly disregards the 
social protocols, conscious and subconscious, of lingual identity” (p. 62). To fragment 
successfully in digital space, the argument continues, the intent must be sincere and the self 
must be evaluated through a moral lens. Nolan represents a tradition of scholarship that 
respects the meaningful implications of a digital persona. This tradition rejects the notion of IRL 
(In Real Life) by asserting the “realness” of online life. As mentioned above, I intend to augment 
this tradition by taking a slightly different tack. 
To do I this, I begin by combining two arguments from Anscombe. In the first, Anscombe 
(1958) reintroduces, and advocates for, Aristotelian virtue ethics, in which moral decisions are 
akin to skills developed in interaction with a community that seeks eudaimonia, rather than 
demanding adherence to a priori truths. The digital persona of a troll confronts these skills as 
either absent or prone to subversion, often in contrast to offline persona who might publicly 
adhere to them. But when the networked public of any, or many, digital platforms resists trolls, 
the skills needed for a digital eudaimonia are naturally highlighted. Offline and online ethical 
skills, while different in some particulars, align enough that the unmasking of a troll persona can 
significantly affect the physical world of the bad actor. And here we can see the traditional 
argument of why online life, and its personae, could be considered “real”. 
The second, which demands more detail, is Anscombe’s concept of first person (1975), 
in which she addresses the inability to reference anything with the word I, a frame to reconsider 
the “realness” of the offline self or, for that matter, any one self. I is, most often, accepted as a 
meaningful reference in both offline and online expressions of self. For example, readers might 
accept that I is a logical reference in both of the statements from HansAssholeSolo. If both were 
accepted in that case, we must assume a radical change of heart took place. But Anscombe has a 
different solution: “‘I’ is neither a name nor another kind of expression whose logical role is to 
make a reference, at all” (p. 32). Citing Locke’s insight that one who thinks “I did it” might be a 
“different thinking substance” than the one thinking “I am doing it", she argues that a re-
identification of the object must take place each time, thus losing its ability to name. Perhaps, 
she considers, I works like a demonstrative, such as “this” or “that", rather than a name, which 
succeeds only if it “catches hold", of its object. Descartes claimed it does, but he only meant this 
in regards to thinking, not a body. Anscombe doesn’t buy it, and her answer portends the 
multiple digital personae we now experience:  
How, even, could one justify the assumption, if it is an assumption, that there is 
just one thinking which is this thinking of this thought that I am thinking, just 
one thinker? How do I know that “I” is not ten thinkers thinking in unison? Or 
perhaps not quite succeeding. That might account for the confusion of thought 
which I sometimes feel. (p. 31)  
So, for Anscombe, I is neither name nor any other expression of reference of a person:  
Note that when I use the word “person” here, I use it in the sense in which it 
occurs in "offences against the person". At this point people will betray how 
deeply they are infected by dualism, they will say: You are using 'person' in the 
sense of “body” - and what they mean by "body" is something that is still there 
when someone is dead. But that is to misunderstand "offences against the 
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person". None such can be committed against a corpse. 'The person' is a living 
human body. (p. 33) 
The dualism becomes demonstrable if people suddenly speak of themselves as another person, 
because it assumes something is not quite right. Anscombe employs William James’ imagining of 
a man named Baldy who falls out of a carriage and bemoans the news that “Baldy” was the one 
who fell out (“Poor Baldy!”) as if he were not the same Baldy. Perhaps he’s hit his head and has 
lost the connection between self and subject, but might still say, “I am sorry for poor Baldy”. 
Anscombe concludes, “[t]he (deeply rooted) grammatical illusion of a subject is what generates 
all the errors” in thinking about the self (p. 36). And so we find self-identity left on the side of 
the road, depending on a word, I, which has no real reference. All admit, however, that I has 
great function in English, so how can this be? 
Rovane’s (2004) answer for establishing selfhood connects the dots nicely. She offers 
two premises for forming, rather than being biologically bestowed with, selfhood: 1) a person is 
“subject to the normative requirement to achieve overall rational unity within itself”; and 2) a 
person “must be committed to satisfying that normative requirement” (p. 238). This is an 
agentive notion of personal identity, and a relational one too. She employs research of 
Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) as a beginning state from which we attempt to knit 
together rational unity, a metaphysical given of human nature. She writes: 
Multiplicity is one of the possible states at which human rational activity could 
be deliberately and coherently directed. When such activity is so directed, it is 
not, of course, carried from one human-size point of view but from multiple 
points of view, each of which has separate ends for the sake of which it is 
striving to achieve rational unity within itself instead of striving for rational 
unity within the whole human being. (Rovane 2004, p. 248) 
This rational unity is a narrative, so argue many personality psychologists (e.g. McAdams 1985; 
Bruner 1994), that extends over time. If it is true that the use of I cannot properly refer to a 
subject, as Anscombe argues, or consistently refer an object, it could still refer to an action: the I 
is a collection of narrated personae, fragmented, as Nolan suggests. So, I is not the subject of 
“this living thing here", but instead the object of “that unifying act there", that character-being 
that is described as acting and thinking in the world and acting and thinking text in digital space. 
There is no fundamental difference in their “reality”. Thus, the power of unmasking a troll. That 
it is not a subject, it seems, is not a problem, because it functions pragmatically in a similar way. 
I identifies an active process of becoming. This does not negate Anscombe’s first person 
argument, but it might render her conclusion less significant. If we agree with the intersection of 
Rovane and personality psychologists, that humans are generally about the business of 
unification of the fragmented personae, then it seems both possible and useful to refer to that 
action as I. This can be referred to, not as a body or as a thinker of thoughts, but only an action 
of a body and its connected brain that engages in a process of unification of components of the 
narrated self, whether the action is deemed successful or not. Even if the character is not 
constant, though recognisable, the action is constant. So, in each of the statements—“I am going 
to the store tomorrow",  “I am going to the store right now", and “I went to the store 
yesterday"—a narration emerges. It is created by the brain, or even algorithms, but is 
determined (to varying degrees based on the person’s ability and desire) by demonstrable 
things that happen in collectively meaning-making worlds. As Dennett (1992) argues:  
We cannot undo those parts of our pasts that are determinate, but our selves 
are constantly being made more determinate as we go along in response to the 
way the world impinges on us. Of course it is also possible for a person to 
engage in auto-hermeneutics, interpretation of one's self, and in particular to 
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go back and think about one's past, and one's memories, and to rethink them 
and rewrite them. (p. 279)  
In all of the cases, the I is the character in the midst of the action. 
But there is still a major problem. If I is a process, what is the subject? I would argue it is 
I. Here Kripke (1982) is useful when he refers to Wittgenstein’s form of life, the set of 
agreements we create to make words mean something specific. The form of life agreement 
among a community of entities (people or perspectives of one person), would be the subject. It 
is the community of “selves” that exists in the brain to form unities that we call or accept as I. As 
Rovane (2004) argues, it is not necessary for a full unification to take place for an I to emerge—
any kind of unity of the fragments in which the community of self agrees to is I. For that is the 
character spoken about in the community. We can understand it simply by thinking about the 
communal agreement being the subject. If you wanted to get dizzying about it you could say, 
“[The form of life that agrees the community within this body has unified to create a perspective 
on one element of this body’s activity] went to the store yesterday”. Or you could just say, “I”. 
All that is necessary here is agreement of what constitutes the I in any given narrative 
case, but to get agreement you must have more than one, because a beginning state of unity gets 
us back to the basic problem. To get to a meaningful first-person persona, and not just an empty 
pronoun, one must have another grammatical person; otherwise there is no community. This is 
where Nolan and Jurgenson lead us, and where Hermans (1996) can round out the argument. 
Hermans argues the target is a relational schema (self-to-self, self-to-other and interpersonal 
script) that drives the “dialogical self", conversations among the many aspects of the self to 
sustain the narrative of a unified I. A dialogical self does not present a “role” for each element of 
the self but rather a “position", which is voiced to other positions. 
The capacity of self-renewal and self-innovation allows the self to engage in an 
active process of positioning. The use of the verbs positioning and 
repositioning allows the dialogical self to take initiatives to position itself in 
new ways, as can be seen in the lives of artists, scientists, and people who 
renew themselves by breaking at times through the limits of custom and 
convention. (Hermans 1996, p. 43) 
These “breakings” of custom and convention can be conceived positively, but they can also 
explain how a troll emerges, especially in an anonymous position. When that breaking occurs 
between the mental unified I and digital persona of a troll, the general assumption is that 
something dark is lurking inside. How the unmasked troll responds to that assumption can be 
critical to understanding how we, too, have created fragmented personae that start to cause 
conflicts, either self-to-self or self-to-other, sometimes to tragic effect. To deny that is true for all 
of us is a dangerous assumption, because our possible negative selves are left unchecked. 
Perhaps the only mindset more dangerous is to believe that digital personae have little or no 
power. Troll-hunting offers an unusual opportunity to understand what that disconnecting, or 
connecting, of physical-digital positions looks like. 
NARRATIVES OF UNMASKING 
If my initial thoughts about trolling was that the creators’ motives were simplistic and cruel, a 
textual analysis of six recent unmaskings in the U.S. and U.K. at least disabused me of the notion 
of its simplicity. The narratives of unmasked personae, and how they aligned with the previous 
troll persona, ranged widely in both expression and content. While I could offer a simple 
division of contrite versus defiant, three more interesting categories emerged from the cases.  
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To perform the analysis, I scraped information from media accounts, social media 
chatter by and about the troll, and media about the unmasking when it was available. Employing 
Fairclough (2003), I focused primarily on the multi-functionality of texts, which he categorises 
in three ways: action (including interpersonal), representation and identification. These three 
functions work nicely as a frame for persona as each represents a negotiation with publics in 
digital space. But I also focused heavily on “mediation", which Fairclough cites via Silverstone as 
the “movement of meaning", transported across “networks” of texts he calls “genre chains”: 
... these are different genres which are regularly linked together, involving 
systematic transformations from genre to genre. Genre chains contribute to the 
possibility of actions which transcend differences in space and time, linking 
together social events in different social practices, different countries, and 
different times, facilitating the enhanced capacity for ‘action at a distance’ 
which has been taken to be a defining feature of contemporary ‘globalization’, 
and therefore facilitating the exercise of power. (p. 31) 
This is particularly useful in analysing digital media, which now switches from kind to kind 
effortlessly, from the formal and attainable journalistic approach to informal and, at times, 
arcane discourse of social media. Journalism often intensifies and reduces discourse due to 
professional norms, and the journalist's own limited perspective, to create efficient meanings 
easily consumed. And journalist-induced unmaskings shift the locus of control from the troll to 
the journalist. Even then, however, the shock of unmasking did not homogenise the narratives 
among the outed trolls. Each had a particular response to the revelation the he or she had been 
found out. The responses included three distinct narratives 1) “not really me”; 2) “freedom to 
speak”; and 3) “trolling as justice”. What is interesting in examining each is the relative size of 
the rift between personae of the unmasked. The “not really me” narrative suggests a large rift 
between offline and online persona, while the other two present much smaller gaps, but for 
different reasons. 
Not really me  
As illustrated above, unmasking of some trolls led to a narrative of quick differentiation 
between personae, somewhat similar to the classic “devil made me do it” defence. The “devil” in 
these cases was often the affordance of anonymity. It seems in the statement shared at the 
beginning of this paper, the man who went by HansAssholeSolo on reddit uses I to refer to 
something approximating a unified self when he says “I am in no way this kind of person, I love 
and accept people of all walks of life and have done so for my entire life” (Kaczynski 2017). But 
logic would dictate a rationale for his online actions and this would-be unmasked troll had the 
impetus to reconsider the effect of toxic digital discourse. He wrote on reddit: 
To people who troll on the Internet for fun, consider your words and actions 
conveyed in your message and who it might upset or anger. Put yourself in their 
shoes before you post it. If you have a problem with trolling it is an addiction 
just like any other addiction someone can have to something and don't be 
embarrassed to ask for help. Trolling is nothing more than bullying a wide 
audience. Don't feed your own self-worth based upon inflicting suffering upon 
others online just because you are behind a keyboard. (Kaczynski 2017) 
It is reasonable to suspect that the chance to remain anonymous guided such rapid reflection 
and repentance.  
In a case with far greater consequences, a 24-year-old Isabella Sorley was jailed for 
twelve weeks for making menacing threats on Twitter (Thomas 2014). After she served the 
sentence, Sorley agreed to be confronted by one of her victims, a woman named Natalie, in a 
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meeting arranged by the BBC. This is a vigorous example of Fairclough’s genre chains and the 
rapid shift in power. Because the courts, traditional media and social media interact in this case, 
the powerless victim of trolling is given the upper hand, with the large media organisation 
dictating the structure and, ultimately, mediating the engagement for the gratification of an 
audience. In this situation, the fully unmasked Sorley communicates a similar distance from her 
troll persona I on Twitter. Her narrative also takes on a “devil made me do it” theme, but Sorley 
uniquely leaves room for uncertainty about the offline-online disconnect. Here is an exchange 
from the BBC (Thomas 2014): 
Sorley: I'd say I'm quite a nice person. 
Natalie: If you're such a good person. Why did you send tweets - including 'Go 
kill yourself', 'Rape?! I'd do a lot worse things than rape you!!' and 'just got out 
of prison and would happily do more time to see you buried'? 
Sorley: I'd been on an incredibly heavy night out. It was 80p a drink. So, take 
20 quid, you're going to be smashed. I can't completely blame alcohol but it's 
definitely got a part to play in it. I'm a follower, not a leader, and I saw a lot of 
people were sending those tweets. To say that I'd do worse things than rape is 
utterly appalling, it's disgusting. I've questioned myself - is there something 
wrong with my mental state? 
Sorley creates clear divisions between three I’s in this explanation: the offline past self, the 
online past self and the present self. But, for Sorley, the causes are largely mapped back onto her 
offline self—drunkenness and a proclivity to follow—rather than using the affordances of 
digital anonymity as a catalyst. This could be a result of time to reflect, and with that, she evokes 
a sense of confusion about how two personae connected to her I could be so disparate. Here 
again, we see a capitulation to the closing of a gap between offline and online decision-making 
with a clear repudiation of one digital persona that Sorley had created on Twitter. These cases, 
however, proved to be the minority. 
Freedom to troll  
A very common theme in trolling is either the harmlessness of digital actions and/or the implicit 
right to post nearly anything as a digital ethic. Not surprisingly then, these are common 
narratives of an unmasked a troll. One interesting and complex set of reactions, in that regard, 
comes for a 2012 unmasking by Gawker journalist Adrian Chen, who used deft digital forensics 
to root out the person behind the reddit troll Violentacrez, known for his “unending fountain of 
racism, porn, gore, misogyny, incest” (Chen 2012). By the time Chen had built his case to prove 
that Violentacrez was Michael Brutsch, a 49-year-old programmer for a Texas financial services 
firm, he was busy informing Brutsch of the impending article to come and seeking comment. 
The similarities between the Violentacrez story and HanAssholeSolo are overshadowed by key 
differences: the Gawker journalist was clear on his intent to publicly unmask his troll, while the 
CNN journalist was ready to keep the offline identity secret based on a few conditions. In that 
sense, Brutsch is more like Sorley, but without the time to reflect. Still, Brutsch’s complete lack 
of regret is notable, even as he pleaded with Chen to keep his offline identity secret. He argues 
that he needed to keep his job, because his wife was disabled. He offered to delete his most 
offensive posts and act as a spy for Chen in reddit’s darkest spaces. But when asked if he 
regretted any of his trolling, the answer was blatant: "I would stand by exactly what I've done" 
(Chen 2012). The rationale included a mild equivocation on harm (“It's not like I do anything 
illegal"), but the predominant narrative was freedom. 
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He needed to keep his anonymity to protect his ability to express things many 
people think but hardly anyone says. With Violentacrez, "I got the freedom to 
talk about my personal life, my personal feelings... I'm sure there's more than 
one person in this building who's a pervert", he said, referring his office 
building. (Chen 2012) 
That logic reveals a narrative of greater unity between the online and offline I, probably 
because it is largely supported by a large reddit community itself, which forms a twisted kind of 
ethic. Even before Gawker published the article, more than sixty subreddits had banned the 
publication. Chen quotes another online platform that covers social media, The Daily Dot, to lay 
out the ethic as it is practiced. Here the real enemy is “doxing", the term of preference of 
unmasking for the Internet: 
At Web communities like Reddit, which thrive because users are free to say and 
do anything they want, doxing is a severe crime, both to users and the site's 
staff. It's far worse than offensive speech like racism and homophobia or, yes, 
even posting surreptitiously snapped photos of innocent women for creeps to 
perv over. Why? Because doxing undermines the community's structural 
integrity: Reddit simply would not exist as we know it if users weren't 
operating under the freedom of a flexible identity. So redditors aren't banning 
Gawker to protect violentacrez, they're doing it to protect themselves. (Chen 
2012) 
Freedom, rather than decency or civility, is the moral that transfers from offline to online. In 
claiming that, the unified I appears to defy convention on both sides of the digital divide. 
Trolling as justice  
The narratives of trolling as justice and freedom to troll cross over into one another more than 
once. But the trolling as justice is unique in that it not only defends the troll persona, but also 
often attacks, again, the target of the trolling to justify itself. That was the narrative of an 
Internet troll named @sweepyface, who was unmasked by television station Sky News for 
trolling the McCann family, which had become public figures after their child went missing. In a 
brief confrontational interview caught on camera, the woman behind @sweepyface, 63-year-old 
Brenda Leyland of Leicestershire, defended herself by saying she was “entitled” to troll the 
family (Smith 2014). However, while still fully masked but clearly feeling pursued, 
@sweepyface narrativised her trolling persona as a force for justice and transparency, bolstered 
by the belief that the McCanns were involved in their child’s disappearance. “I fear that we are 
in this 4 the long haul, up to all of us to a) Bang home the facts b) make #mccann s live in shame 
for years” (Smith 2014). When the reporter who would eventually unmask Leyland began to 
follow @sweepyface on Twitter, she wondered in a tweet why he wouldn’t “investigate some of 
these facts and show neutrality”.  
This seemed, for a time, to fit neatly in the category of trolling as justice, but a brutal 
twist belied Leyland’s narrative. Just two days after Sky News aired the report about her, 
Leyland was found dead in a hotel room in a Leicester hotel room, a death later determined to 
be suicide (Davies & Conlan 2015). In the inquest, it was clear that @sweepyface’s persona was 
no match for Leyland’s offline persona in the battle for a unified I. In a conversation with the 
reporter before the story aired, she told him, “Oh, I’ve thought about ending it all but I am 
feeling better. I have had a drink and I’ve spoken to my son”. While the inquest made it clear 
that Leyland suffered from depression, and had attempted suicide before, her son wrote in a 
statement that was read at the inquest that Leyland “could not bear to think she could be 
disliked by those in her community” (Davies & Conland 2015).  
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In a very different outcome, also in England, Twitter troll @Holbornlolz spun a narrative 
of defender of liberty and attacker of institutions, as well as a digital satirist. What distinguishes 
this narrative is the timeframe—he made one part of the argument during the unmasking 
confrontation, when it became clear he was 51-year-old Robert Ambridge of Essex, and another 
part of the argument two years after being unmasked (Murfitt & Luck 2013; Daubney 2015). 
Here the power differential is more unclear: who is getting the best of whom in the exchange? 
On the one hand, the reporters are getting behind the digital persona, and arguably exposing the 
offline persona’s justifications. On the other hand, Ambridge could arguably be normalising the 
act of trolling in the broader culture. In the moment of realisation that he had been unmasked, 
Ambridge focused most of the harmlessness (“entertainment”) of his actions, which included 
making fun of people’s bodies and using tragedies such as the Boston Marathon bombing as 
fodder for his “satire”. He told the reporters who unmasked him: “This is dark humour. People 
might not like my humour but I think it is funny and it gets a chuckle” (Murfitt & Luck 2013). In 
that statement, the offline I seems to pull the online I closer, while simultaneously objectifying it 
with praise and acknowledgement of enjoyment from others. Two years later, even after 
Ambridge was forced to move to another town, his narrative had become more sophisticated 
and more tied to justice: "I’m here to expose the hypocrisy of it all. I despise politicians, their 
endless lies, their assumed authority and the constant interference of ‘the State’ in how I choose 
to live my life" (Daubney 2015). But it wasn’t only offline institutions he intended to check, it 
was also the conventions of the Internet itself.  
Now let's be honest here, most people adore being outraged. It gives them the 
aura of moral superiority and they can parade their smugness for all to see and 
judge them by. They can wear it as a badge to indicate their adherence to ‘better 
standards’ as if that gives them the right to silence anyone who doesn't 
measure up to their ideals. (Daubney 2015)  
What is clear in the juxtaposition of these two cases is that both online and offline personae can 
spin similar narratives while the distance between a perceived I and the digital persona varies 
greatly. It is also clear that distance does not necessarily determine the actions of the digital 
persona—both can spout hateful speech, but the unmasking of the digital troll can have very 
different consequences. Morrissey and Yell (2016, p. 29) examine this briefly in light of the 
Leyland case writing, “[t]he relation between the public persona of the troll as manifested in 
their online discourse, and their private selves is complex and apparently contradictory”. In my 
analysis, I found that “apparently contradictory” depends on the troll him or herself. 
BEYOND AUTHENTICITY AND TOWARD COMMUNITY 
The premise of this paper was to observe the responses about the distance between digital and 
offline I’s when trolls are unmasked by troll-hunters; not as a form of schadenfreude or even to 
better understand trolls, but as a lens into all personae in digital space. Wrested from the 
subject of trolling, the three themes of why we divide our online-offline personae still hold: the 
online self is “not really me”; 2) we have the freedom to act differently online; and 3) what we 
do online is just. Not surprisingly, the variation was as great as the masks themselves, but there 
are possible extrapolations.  In this same journal, McRae (2017, p. 25) makes a statement that 
resonates with the identity play of Phillips and Milner (2017): “To some extent, we all craft 
personas with a real or imagined critical audience in mind”. How we wish to affect those 
imagined audiences is a meaningful difference between most of us and trolls. However, the 
crafting of the persona as something different than our offline personas likely has fewer 
differences. It is still common, and understandable, to accept some “freedom” in crafting a 
digital persona. Digital life affords “shaping” of a self, “no one knows you’re a dog", as the 
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cartoon trope goes, but there’s a point missing in this. That point refers all the way back to a 
realisation that the collection of digital personae that populate social platforms come with 
different expectations and predispositions. In seeking or encountering audiences for the “game” 
of identity, users soon find themselves negotiating (or flat-out fighting) for virtues of “how to 
be” in digital space. That some of these spaces feel encapsulated from a larger society, digital or 
physical, would only reinforce the sense of freedom. In this negotiation, Phillips and Milner 
(2017, p. 85) convincingly argue the role of anonymity is not necessarily predictive of one form 
of behaviour: “In short, deindividuated, anonymous participation online can facilitate the bad, 
the good, and the in-between, resulting in every permutation of communicative expression 
imaginable”. This freedom, like all real freedom, takes on different forms. But what the 
unmasking of trolls demonstrates is how quickly the communicative expression can change 
when implications from two different aspects of the self collide. 
This is clear even in the most rigorous defence narratives of trolls. Shame is just as 
powerful, if not more so, than confirmation and sycophancy. The consequences for “breakings” 
from a generalised norm can feel as meaningful online as it does offline, and that’s assuming 
that the consequences don’t cross-contaminate the other. McRae (2017, p. 14) deftly explains 
why, despite these consequences, some trolls I examined (like any other social media persona) 
hold closely to their narrative of freedom or justice to resist judgment from others: 
When publics perceive evidence of unoriginality and inconsistency in [...] 
personas, they are less likely to accept personas as authentic, recognizing 
instead that personas are constructed. 
Had Violentacrez responded the way HanAssholeSolo did, he would have likely met the same 
digital fate: scorn and obliteration from his own community. It seems clear from Violentacrez’s 
narrative that remaining “authentic” to his community of trolls was more important than 
becoming palatable to his offline community, such as his workplace, which fired him. The idea 
that one set of personae (the offline set) would have many important life implications, while the 
other set (online) would live free of those implications is a naiveté that has been exposed for 
years. In referring to cybersex, for example, Dibbell (1993) made this point a quarter of a 
century ago:  
To participate, therefore, in this disembodied enactment of life's most body-
centered activity is to risk the realization that when it comes to sex, perhaps 
the body in question is not the physical one at all, but its psychic double, the 
bodylike self-representation we carry around in our heads. I know, I know, 
you've read Foucault and your mind is not quite blown by the notion that sex 
is never so much an exchange of fluids as it is an exchange of signs. But trust 
your friend Dr. Bombay, it's one thing to grasp the notion intellectually and 
quite another to feel it coursing through your veins amid the virtual steam of 
hot netnookie. 
Jurgenson (2011) extrapolates this one experience to all digital experiences when he contests 
the concept of a “second self” as digital dualism and argues that all of the experiences live in one 
sphere rather than two: “[w]e are not crossing in and out of separate digital and physical 
realities, ala The Matrix, but instead live in one reality, one that is augmented by atoms and 
bits”. Mine is less an argument to yet again defend the “realness” of online life and more an 
honest look at the construction of self through all aspects of a life. “In short, we all deceive, on 
the internet and in our own living rooms” (Phillips & Milner 2017, p. 81). Even beyond 
deception of others, we daily deceive ourselves in constructing an a priori version of I. 
Postmodernist thought, and much of personality psychology, has also travelled down this road 
for decades now. On a practical level, however, we continue to see daily signs that the 
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commonality among an individual’s personae, across all related I’s, is lost on many when they 
log in to digital platforms. The unifying theme of digital self, anonymous or not, is less a certain 
way to be, but the dualism itself. 
Werning (2017) turns the common response, prosecuting the mask as inauthentic, into 
prosecuting the notion of reality as it is often perceived. In that light, the mask is what is 
authentic. In a postmodern world, this seems particularly wise. On the other hand, I am sceptical 
of McRae’s (2017) solution of authenticity as labour, at least as it applies to negotiating the 
moral landscape of public digital life vis-a-vis trolls. Unmaskings have taught us that the range of 
authenticity varies widely among trolls. Instead, I would like to return to Anscombe’s virtue 
ethics as a possible lever from which to activate a digital eudaimonia. It is sometimes lost that 
digital persona is a very new phenomenon, especially compared to ancient concepts of persona. 
Just because persona acts similarly in digital space, and often evokes similar consequences, does 
not mean human beings have gained proficiency in learning to act morally as digital personae, 
yet. Virtue ethics argues that building an atmosphere for thriving means developing social 
agreements and honing individual virtue. There is no clear right or wrong in digital space unless 
desired outcomes are widely agreed upon. To be authentic seems too individually constructed, 
both in creating and judging its presence. To create a space where the most people thrive 
reflects an age-old practice of building eudaimonic cultures. That’s not to discount authenticity 
as whole, but rather shifts the focus on developing strong, positive relationships for the good of 
the whole digital ecosystem. “I am in no way this” is less a division and more a statement of 
becoming within a system that would foster personae that benefit communities. If this sounds 
naive, so it is, if we think that a majority of personae wanting such a digital eudaimonia naturally 
produces it. And that might offer one more lesson from all three categories of trolls and the 
troll-hunters who unmasked them. While there is a range of ethical modifiers that might be used 
for trolls, from vile to problematic to mischievous, there is a neutral attribute they share that is 
generally worth stealing: most are vocal about creating the digital world in which they want to 
be. 
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